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Political clientelism is a dyadic relation in which a politician (the patron) gives
material goods and services to a citizen (the client), in exchange for political
support. We argue that there is a two-way relation between clientelism and
income inequality and poverty. In a poor society in which income inequality is
high, clientelism will be a natural outcome. Once clientelism is established, it is
harder for democracy to redistribute income and it is easier for the society to be
caught in a poverty trap. We develop a two-part game-theoretic model. In the
ﬁrst part, clientelism emerges in a poor and unequal society as a consequence
of social preferences, in particular, strong reciprocity. In the second part, using
evolutionary and stochastic game theory, we show that clientelism causes income
inequality and poverty.
1 Introduction
July of 2007 was the month in which the Colombian government reported that in
the past weeks, in 16 states of the country, the Sisben, the system used for allocating
welfare state expenses, was manipulated by politicians for electoral purposes. This
system classiﬁes people according to their income and socio-economic status, and of-
fers beneﬁts, subsidies, and services according to this classiﬁcation. It can be inferred
from this report that the system is an important instrument used by politicians for
the establishment of clientelistic links: citizens who give political support and votes
to certain candidates that may inﬂuence the assignment of subsidies, may beneﬁt
from the system. The problem is that some medium-income people are classiﬁed as
belonging to the ﬁrst tier of the system, which implies the biggest ﬂow of beneﬁts.
In contrast, some low-income citizens are erroneously classiﬁed as those not deserv-
ing subsidies. This shows that clientelism may become an important obstacle for
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1redistributive programs, and, as we will show in this article, may perpetuate income
inequality and poverty.
During the 1950’s, the time in which La Violencia (The Violence) consumed the
lives of thousands of Colombians whofought against each other for political reasons,
the former peasant Dumar Aljure became the leader of a guerrilla army Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).1 Maullin (1968) and the Rand Cor-
poration document how during a period of several years Aljure established a relation
with the liberal senator Hernando Duran, in which the senator, using his inﬂuence
in the central government at Bogota, secured Aljure’s group from being persecuted
by Colombian militaries. Apparently, this protection was reciprocated by Aljure
with votes and political support by people under his inﬂuence. Closing the network,
in exchange for their votes, citizens received from Aljure security and guarantees
against political persecution that during the 1950’s was at its most severe. In 1968
Duran was defeated in the elections, and months later, the Army killed Aljure. The
clientelistic link broke up.
Another example illustrates how a whole century of Colombian political history
was permeated by clientelism. The 1904 presidential election was won by general
Rafael Reyes. For some scholars [Maitre (1964) and Schmidt (1974)] this victory
was guaranteed by an important regional leader, gamonal2 Juanito Iguar´ an [Schmidt
(1974), p.9]. The gamonal acted as a broker between the national-level politician,
and the rural habitants. Naturally, these links permitted the exchange of votes and
political support for material goods and services. But clientelism is not an exclusive
Colombian phenomenon. Important studies characterize clientelism in southeast
Asia [Scott (1972)], tropical Africa [Lemarchand (1972)], Southern Italy [Golden
and Picci (2005)], Japan [Kobayashi (2006)], Mexico [Greene (2001)], Argentina
[Weitz-Shapiro (2007)], and several other countries and regions. How could we deﬁne
clientelism? Is clientelism exclusive of twentieth-century democracy or is it found in
other political regimes along human history?
Clientelism is a dyadic (two-person) relation in which a patron gives material
goods, services, beneﬁts, or protection to a client, who reciprocates with some type of
general, political, or military support and assistance. Political clientelism is a special
case of what we could term general clientelism. Political clientelism is characterized
by a politician who acts as the patron, oﬀering goods, services, jobs, resources,
protection, etc., to a voter, in exchange for political support, which in most cases,
includes the vote. The conjunction of several dyads and relations forms a clientelistic
network, as those described in the examples given above. Nation-level leaders are
linked with regional, rural and urban brokers, who establish relations with voters.
Even though clientelism may appear in a developed country, it is frequently asso-
ciated with poverty, income inequality and underdevelopment. Some questions arise
after recognizing this fact: what causes clientelism? What are the consequences of
1It is not clear if nowadays FARC, the biggest guerrilla in Colombia, evolved form this group
commanded by Aljure.
2The term gamonal refers to regional political leaders, whose position in society gives them
inﬂuence upon rural voters.
2clientelism? In this article we show how there’s a two-way relation between clien-
telism and inequality and poverty. First, a poor society, in which income inequality
is high, constitutes a natural environment for clientelism to emerge. Politicians will
ﬁnd it easier to establish patron-client relations when citizens lack of several material
goods and services because of poverty. And second, if the political system becomes
clientelistic, it’s harder for democracy to work and it’s easier for the economy to fall
into a poverty trap.
This paper is divided into six sections, including this introduction. In section 2 we
brieﬂy introduce the ﬁrst part of our model, explaining why social preferences theory
is an interesting framework for studying clientelism. Section 3 relates income and
poverty with clientelism. Using behavioral game theory, we show how this relation
is mediated by strong reciprocity. Section 4 shows what the impact of clientelism
is on the evolution of income inequality. As clientelism grows, it is more probable
that non-egalitarian contracts regulate the division of surplus within a society. In
section 5 we consider agents with bounded rationality, who learn and adapt their
behavior over time, and who are exposed to stochastic shocks that may dislodge the
incumbent political regime. Clientelism make non-egalitarian contracts both more
persistent and accessible. Section 6 concludes the article.
2 Social Preferences and Clientelism: the role of Reci-
procity
Two waves of study characterize academic work on clientelism [Stokes (2007)]. The
ﬁrst wave, inspired in anthropology and sociology, puts emphasis on moral sentiments
diﬀerent from self-interest as the basic explanation of clientelism.3 For the second
wave, mainly inspired by economics,4 agents respond to self interest when engaging
in a clientelistic relation. In this article, we try to reconcile both approaches. For this
purpose behavioral and evolutionary game theory constitute a rigorous and tractable
framework.
For sociologist Gouldner (1960), “a norm of reciprocity, in it’s universal form,
makes two interrelated, minimal demands: (1) people should help those who have
helped them, and (2) people should not injure those who have helped them.” From
this perspective, reciprocity is a universal norm, that structures social interaction.
Many situations are better understood under the scope of reciprocity. In fact, he
adds, “[g]iven signiﬁcant power diﬀerences, egoistic motivations may seek to get
beneﬁts without returning them. [...] The norm of reciprocity, however, engenders
motives for returning beneﬁts even when power diﬀerences might invite exploitation”.
Perhaps, what Gouldner misses, is that reciprocity may engender exploitation that
otherwise would not be engendered, as we show in the case of clientelism.
Adam Smith’s Wealth of the Nations shows how self-interest might be the most
important sentiment when analyzing people’s behavior within market scenarios.
3See for example Lemarchand (1972) or Scott (1972).
4See for example Stokes (2007), Medina (2006), Medina and Stokes (2007), or Robinson and
Verdier (2003).
3Later, neoclassical economics based its analysis on the same tenet. For example, for
Edgeworth (1881) “The ﬁrst principle of economics is that every agent is actuated
only by self-interest”. But Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments shows that human
behavior is not only restricted to self-interest, and that other sentiments condition
behavior in several non-market settings. In short, we will call self-regarding prefer-
ences situations in which an individual’s satisfaction depends uniquely on his own
material payoﬀs. In contrast, an agent exhibits other-regarding or social preferences,
when his satisfaction not only depends on his payoﬀs, but also on the material rev-
enues received by other players. Moral sentiments such as love, hate, envy, inequality
aversion, reciprocity, shame, guilt or parochialism, explain social preferences.
The ultimatum game has become the recurrent example of how social preferences
aﬀect outcomes in non-market situations. In this two-player game, player 1 must
decide how to split x dollars with player 2. He oﬀers an amount s ∈ [0,x] to the
other player. If player 2 accepts, the money is split according to the oﬀer, so that
player 2 gets s while player 1 keeps x−s. But if player 2 rejects the oﬀer, zero is the
payoﬀ for both players. Classical game theory, in which it is assumed that players
exhibit self-regarding preferences, predicts that player 2 will accept any positive
oﬀer. Anticipating this behavior, player 1 oﬀers the minimum amount possible.
But experiments conducted all around the world, in a great variety of contexts and
cultures, contradict this prediction.5 In general, player 2 rejects low oﬀers (below
30% of the pie). Strong reciprocity seems to explain this behavior. An individual
exhibits strong reciprocity when he responds kindly to a kind action (even when
there is an incentive to deviate), and unkindly to those who act rudely (even when
punishment is costly and brings no material beneﬁts). In the ultimatum game, a low
oﬀer is judged as an unkind action by player 2, so he rejects the oﬀer, preferring zero
to a positive payoﬀ. Rejection is the mechanism for punishing the unkind action of
player 1.
But why is reciprocity important when analyzing political clientelism? In his
analysis of African integration and the relation between clientelism and ethnicity,
Lemarchand (1972) states that “clientelism [...] extends these perceptions (mutual
interest and cultural aﬃnities) beyond the realm of primordial loyalties and estab-
lishes vertical links of reciprocity between ethnically or socially discrete entities”.
For Scott (1972)
“The patron-client relationship, [...] may be deﬁned as a special kind
dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in
which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own
inﬂuence and resources to provide protection or beneﬁts, or both, for a
person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by oﬀer-
ing general support and assistance, including personal services, to the
patron”.
This is a general deﬁnition of clientelism, for which political clientelism is a spe-
cial case. The important issue is that reciprocity links the unequal relation between
5See Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, and Fehr (2006), Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, and Gintis
(2004), Bowles (2003), Gintis (2000), or Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991).
4the patron and the client. When the politician gives protection or material beneﬁts
to the citizen, the latter can deviate from cooperation and abstain or give his polit-
ical support to other candidate. Why does he behaves kindly with the clientelistic
candidate? Reciprocity is an explanation. Self-interest could be another one. Afraid
of loosing future beneﬁts or of being punished, the client prefers to reciprocate the
patron with his support. But both explanations, reciprocity and self-interest, are
compatible with one another. In fact, Scott adds that “[a]lthough the balance of
beneﬁts may heavily favor the patron, some reciprocity is involved and it is this
quality which [...] distinguishes patron-client dyads from relationships of pure coer-
cion or formal authority that also may link individuals of diﬀerent status.” Then,
political clientelism may emerge even in situations in which the candidate does not
hold coercive mechanisms or credible threats of punishment against the citizen, as a
consequence of reciprocity.
3 Poverty and Inequality Stimulate Clientelism
Consider a society in which diﬀerent groups (classes) interact in an economic and po-
litical environment during several time periods. In this society, democracy is used for
selecting governors and policymakers. This means that elections are held for decid-
ing who forms the government. Economic relations are regulated by contracts, which
determine how the surplus of economic activities is divided between its participants.
In a society with these characteristics social interactions may adopt various forms.
We will consider two instances in our model. First, we will analyze the interaction
between a politician and a citizen, in which the ﬁrst is seeking political support
(which includes votes), and the second needs public and private goods. Second, we
will analyze the interaction between members of diﬀerent groups when deciding how
to divide production surplus. We assume that each group is interested in obtaining
the largest part of the pie.
We consider a model of clientelism in which a candidate interacts with a citizen in
a two-period sequential game. The politician is always tempted to use other means,
besides ideology, to obtain votes. The provision of material goods or services, which
in short we will call “gifts”, is a feasible strategy for convincing a citizen and winning
his support. We will consider the case of a politician who is not the favorite candidate
of the voter. The voter prefers some other candidate whose proposals are closer to
the citizen’s preferences in the ideological spectrum.6
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the candidate decides whether to give a gift to
the citizen. The citizen then decides whether or not to give political support to
this candidate. Political support may take the simple form of a vote, or can include
more complex features. Let V , V > 0, be the payoﬀ for the politician when he
6In fact, this is the interesting case. If we consider the situation in which a person votes for a
candidate who gives him a gift but is also his favorite candidate, it will be hard to establish the
pervasive consequences of clientelism. It is more interesting to analyze a case in which a voter
sacriﬁces his ideology because a candidate oﬀers short-term material beneﬁts.
5receives political support from the citizen. In our case, V is the “value” of the vote
for the candidate. The cost of giving a gift to the voter is Gp > 0, which may be
a monetary or a psychological cost. Furthermore, let w be the citizen’s wage (or
income) and let’s deﬁne a pair of functions D(w) and C(w), which represent the
beneﬁt for the citizen when voting for his favorite candidate and for the clientelistic
politician, respectively. We assume that
D′(·) > 0; C′(·) < 0 (1)
and,
D(w) ≥ C(w) (2)
for every level of income w > 0. Here, (1) shows that income aﬀects political prefer-
ences. Higher incomes imply more political participation. We model this by assuming
that as income increases, the diﬀerence D(w) − C(w) grows. The “ideological cost”
of not voting for the favorite candidate is higher for more aﬄuent voters. Meanwhile,
(2) reﬂects the fact that the beneﬁt of voting for the favorite candidate is at least as
large as voting for the clientelistic politician. Finally, Gc > 0 is the beneﬁt for the
citizen when he receives a gift. Figure 1 shows the extensive form representation of
the clientelism game. In the ﬁrst stage, the politician (p) gives (g) or not (∼ g) the




































Figure 1: Clientelism Game
With these payoﬀs, it is straightforward to verify that not voting is a dominant
strategy for the citizen. If the politician anticipates this, his best response is to not
give the gift. Consequently, in the clientelism game with self-regarding preferences
(i.e. where a player’s satisfaction only depends on his own payoﬀs), in the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium there is no clientelism. But evidence and intuition
contradict this conclusion. Something is missing in the argument.
In many bilateral interactions that are not regulated by contracts, self-regarding
preferences are not the best description of moral sentiments, as we discussed in the
6preceding section From now on we will assume that the citizen exhibits social prefer-
ences. This means that his satisfaction not only depends on his own payoﬀs, but also
on the payoﬀs of the other player (i.e. the candidate). In this clientelistic relation-
ship, strong reciprocity seems to be fundamental. Following Falk and Fischbacher
(2006) and Gallego (2007) we deﬁne the citizen’s preferences as
u2 = Π2 + ρ2ϕ1σ2
where u2 is the citizen’s satisfaction, Π2 is his material payoﬀ, ρ2 measures the
intensity of reciprocal preferences, ϕ1 represents the kindness or unkindnessperceived
in the candidate’s action, and σ2 is the utility derived from the reciprocal act chosen
by the voter. Let’s explain in detail this representation of Homo Reciprocans.
In this representation of reciprocal preferences, the parameter ρ2 ≥ 0 represents
the importance of reciprocity for the citizen. When ρ2 = 0 preferences are totally
self-regarding. As ρ2 increases, the intensity of reciprocity grows for this voter. The
candidate’s actions, and his own reactions, become more important.
The kindness term, ϕ1, is an indicator of whether the action chosen by the




1 if s1 = g
−1 if s1 =∼ g
Thus, the value of ϕ1 is positive if the action is kind, and negative if it’s judged as
unkind. Now we will deﬁne the utility of the reciprocal act, σ2. If s2 is the action
chosen by the citizen, the utility of this reciprocal act is given by
σ2(s2) =
(
Π1(s1,v) − Π1(s1,∼ v) if s2 = v
Π1(s1,∼ v) − Π1(s1,v) if s2 =∼ v
The intuition behind this deﬁnition is straightforward. The utility of the reciprocal
act committed by the citizen is represented by how the payoﬀ of the candidate
changes because of this act. When the citizen reciprocates in a kind way, he votes
for the politician, and his reciprocal satisfaction will be the diﬀerence between the
candidate’s material payoﬀ when he receives the vote and when he doesn’t receive
it. Then, when the voter reciprocates kindly, the value of σ2 is positive. When
he responds unkindly, σ2 is negative because the utility of the reciprocal act is the
diﬀerence between the politician’s payoﬀ when he doesn’t receive the vote and when
he receives it.
Now we can make the distinction between the material payoﬀs of the game, as
represented in Figure 1, and satisfaction payoﬀs, which include the citizen’s moral
sentiments (reciprocity). When the voter receives a gift and votes for the candidate,
his utility is
u2(g,v) = C(w) + Gc + ρ2V (3)
7When he receives the gift but doesn’t vote for the clientelistic candidate, his utility
is
u2(g,∼ v) = D(w) + Gc − ρ2V (4)
When the citizen votes for the candidate even though no gift was given, his utility is
u2(∼ g,v) = C(w) − ρ2V. (5)
Finally, when there’s no gift and no vote, the utility for the citizen is
u2(∼ g,∼ v) = D(w) + ρ2V. (6)
In this model we assume that the politician’s preferences are self-regarding when
engaged in a clientelistic relationship. Then, his satisfaction payoﬀs are equal to his
material payoﬀs. Considering this fact and using conditions (3), (4), (5), and (6),
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Figure 2: Clientelism Game With Reciprocal Preferences
Using backward induction we can solve for the reciprocal equilibrium (subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium with reciprocal preferences7). When the candidate doesn’t
give a gift, it is always better for the citizen not to vote for him. The citizen will
abstain or vote for his ideologically favorite candidate. Obviously, an interesting case
arises when the politician oﬀers a gift. In this case, for the citizen it is better to
reciprocate by voting if







A careful analysis of condition (7) can help us understand some of the basic issues
concerning clientelism. First, a dyadic relation such as clientelism, in which the
patron oﬀers materials goods and/or services to his client, while the latter gives, in
exchange, political support (including the vote), is better understood as a conse-
quence of strong reciprocity, rather than self-regarding preferences. After receiving
a gift, the voter may be tempted to betray his patron by voting for his favorite can-
didate. But some material sentiment deters this attitude, and certainly we conclude
it is reciprocity.
Some conditions make clientelism the most probable outcome. Condition (7)
means that the intensity of reciprocal preferences should be greater than certain
threshold so that the citizen prefers supporting the clientelistic candidate. This
threshold is µ∗ =
D(w)−C(w)
2V . When µ∗ is small enough, it is easier for clientelism
to emerge as an equilibrium in this game. But µ∗ decreases if V increases or if
the diﬀerence D(w) − C(w) decreases. This last point is important. If ideological
concerns are less important for the citizen, the expression D(w)−C(w) gets smaller.
But remember that both terms, which represent the beneﬁts from voting for the
preferred candidate or for the clientelistic candidate, depend on the citizen’s level
of income w. Besides, D′(w) > 0 while C′(w) < 0, because as income increases,
political concerns grow and ideology becomes more important for the citizen, so it
is better for him to vote for his preferred candidate than to support someone that is
further from his ideal point on the ideological spectrum.
In sum, when incomes are low, ideological concerns are less important, so the
threshold for clientelism to emerge reduces. Clientelism would be the result of a
society with high levels of poverty and income inequality, in which a large part of its
habitants live in poor conditions and whose incomes are not enough for satisfying
basic needs. This simple model supports the ﬁrst line of causality between clien-
telism and income inequality and poverty. Clientelism is more likely to emerge in a
poor society with high income inequality, because in this context it is easier for the
politician to establish a patron-client relationship.
From (7) it is also clear that as V grows, µ∗ decreases, so that it is easier for
clientelism to appear. But remember that V is the beneﬁt for the politician of
receiving that vote. This means that if oﬃce holding is highly valued, clientelism is
a good mechanism for winning votes. Also, we expect that when elections are more
competitive, or perhaps more tied, clientelism will be a useful strategy for politicians.
There’s another interesting interpretation of this result. V is the value of that
vote for the candidate. As V increases, the incentive of capturing that vote also
grows, so clientelism might be a eﬃcient strategy. Within a clientelistic network,
politicians select carefully who their clients are. Perhaps, a citizen capable of con-
vincing many others is better than an isolated person. Regional and local leaders
serve as excellent brokers whose political support can represent lots of votes.
94 Clientelism Stimulates Income Inequality
In this section we consider the second part of the model. Economic activity is a
consequence of cooperation between members of diﬀerent groups or, what we will
call, social classes. The beneﬁt or surplus generated by economic activity must be
divided between members of these groups. For example, landowners and sharecrop-
pers have to decide how to split the beneﬁt of agricultural activities, while capital
owners and workers must decide how they divide a ﬁrm’s revenues. We are inter-
ested in understanding the political-economic forces behind the struggle for these
beneﬁts, because its division determines directly how income is distributed within a
society. Institutional arrangements determine how surplus is divided, and in many
modern economic relations, contracts specify in detail how this process materializes.
Contracts and institutions may be formal or informal. A formal contract speciﬁes
in detail the aspects that regulate a relationship, within a legal document. Informal
contracts include habits and customs that determine people’s behavior.
To model the distribution of income within a society, consider a group of people
divided into two subgroups. Each subgroup is a social class such as tenants and
landlords, or workers and capitalists. We will call the classes C and W, and we
assume the number of members in each class is large. Each time period a member of
each population is randomly paired to interact in a stage game Γ, with a member of
the other class. For the sake of simplicity, we will model interactions as a coordination
game as shown in Figure 3.
Class C
Class W
Contract 0 Contract 1
Contract 0 π0, w0 0, 0
Contract 1 0, 0 π1, w1
Figure 3: Contract game
Class C agents choose rows, while those of class W play columns. Players are
randomly paired during t = 1,2,... time periods, and each time period they must
decide what type of contract they accept for dividing the gains of cooperation during
the economic activity. Consequently, πk + wk represents the total surplus to be
divided, when contract k is selected, between the capitalist and the worker, or the
landowner and the sharecropper. From the payoﬀ matrix we can conclude that
when players do not agree upon the same contract, their payoﬀ is zero as no economic
activity takes place if there is no previous agreement upon how the surplus is divided
between participants. When there is an agreement, and both players coordinate on
the same contract, each one gains a positive payoﬀ. The following relation between
payoﬀs is an important assumption of the model:
10π0 > π1 = w1 > w0 (8)
This contract game has two strict pure strategy Nash equilibria: Both players
choosing contract 0, or both selecting contract 1. This is the key issue of contracts.
Players adopt the same action they expect other players will adopt. Condition (8)
characterize these contract conventions. Contract 1 is an egalitarian institution,
in which income is distributed equally among players, while contract 0 is a non-
egalitarian one, favoring members of Class C (landowners or capitalists, for example).
If income distribution is a consequence of repeated interactions among members of
social classes, with power and collective action as the forces behind the struggle,
what type of contracts will be selected by evolutionary forces? In game-theoretic
terms, which equilibrium will be selected in the medium and the long run?
The strategy sets for populations C and W are the same, and we call them
SC = SW = {0,1}, where 0 stands for contract 0, while 1 stands for contract 1.
We will assume that players are “programmed” to follow some strategy s ∈ Si, for
i = C,W. In short, we say that a player is of “type s” when he is programmed to
choose contract s. Consequently, members of each population are of type 0 or of
type 1, and it is of our interest to understand what forces determine the evolution
in the proportion of agents accepting or rejecting one contract or the other.
Let x ∈ [0,1] be the proportion of class C members of type 0. Then 1 − x is the
proportion of type 1 agents in population C. In a similar way, y is the proportion of
type 0 agents in class W, while 1−y is the proportion of players programmed to play
contract 1 in this population. The expected payoﬀ for a C-class player programmed
to follow contract 0, given the frequency distribution (y,1−y) in class W, is uC(0,y),
while uC(1,y) is the equivalent payoﬀ for a type 1. Similarly, uW(x,0) and uW(x,1)
are the expected payoﬀs, respectively, for types 0 and 1 within population W, when
(x,1 − x) is the frequency distribution of types in population C. Then, the average
payoﬀs in both populations are:
¯ uC(x,y) =xuC(0,y) + (1 − x)uC(1,y), and
¯ uW(x,y) =yuW(x,0) + (1 − y)uW(x,1).
We will use the replicator dynamics proposed originally by Taylor and Jonker
(1978) to analyze the long run evolution [Gale, Binmore, and Samuleson (1995)]
of the proportion of players following each strategy. This approach could be ques-
tioned because in the replicator dynamics it is assumed that players are programmed
to follow some strategy. Perhaps, this makes sense in biological models, where the
genotype of an organism determines traits and physical characteristics that can-
not be modiﬁed. But in social systems, agents learn and adapt their behavior, so
that a programmed player might not be the most accurate description in these set-
tings. However, several works show how certain learning dynamics converge towards
the replicator dynamics [Binmore and Samuelson (1997), Borgers and Sarin (1997),
Cabrales (2000)]. In fact, for the results of this paper, we only need payoﬀ monotonic
11dynamics, in which the growth rates of players following each strategy are strictly
monotonic in their expected payoﬀs [Young (1998)].
Given these considerations, we can describe the dynamics of the system. If ˙ x = ∂x
∂t
and ˙ y =
∂y
∂t express how the proportions of type 0 agents in each population evolve
over time, the replicator equations are
˙ x =x[uC(0,y) − ¯ uC(x,y)], and
˙ y =y[uW(x,0) − ¯ uW(x,y)].
Then, it is clear that the proportion of agents of each population following con-
tract 0 increases when their expected payoﬀ is greater than the average payoﬀ, and
vice versa. This is why the replicator dynamics are a Darwinian-Malthusian descrip-
tion of a dynamical system. The “ﬁttest” strategies survive, while weak strategies
become extinct over time. Will non-egalitarian contracts prevail or will evolution
transform society into a more egalitarian one? Before answering this important
question, we must consider a key characteristic of human beings, inequality aver-
sion.
A stylized fact recognized in several experiments is that people dislike unequal
situations. Most human beings feel uncomfortable when they are below other peo-
ple. In fact, evidence suggests that some people prefer not to have more than others.
Inequality aversion is another variant of social preferences, because in this case peo-
ple’s satisfaction depend not only on their absolute payoﬀs, but also on their relative
gains or losses. How could we model this type of preferences? First, we must make
a distinction between material payoﬀs and satisfaction. Following Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), preferences of a Homo Equalis (i.e. a player with inequality aversion) are
given by
ui(Πi,Πj) = Πi − αi max{Πj − Πi,0} − βi max{Πi − Πj,0} (9)
where ui is player i’s satisfaction, Πi is the material payoﬀ for player i, αi ≥ 0
measures the disutility provoked by disadvantageous inequality, and βi ≥ 0 measures
how much dissatisfaction provokes advantageous inequality. For an agent with these
preferences, ﬁnal satisfaction not only depend on his own payoﬀs, but also on relative
payoﬀs. Inequality reduces his utility, both if he is on top or below the other player.
It’s natural to assume that αi ≥ βi: for player i, a disadvantageous situation is worst
than an advantageous one. Also, βi ≤ 1, otherwise, player i would punish himself at
any advantageous situation, something that seems to make no sense for most human
beings.
In this fashion, in our model we assume that players experiment inequality aver-
sion, as the following assumption states.
Assumption 1.
Members of populations C and W exhibit inequality aversion, and their preferences
12are described by (9). More precisely, the utility of a C-population member is of the
form
uC(πk,wk) = πk − αC max{wk − πk,0} − βC max{πk − wk,0} (10)
when contract k, k = 0,1, is chosen. In a similar way, the utility of a W-population
member is of the form
uW(πk,wk) = wk − αW max{πk − wk,0} − βW max{wk − πk,0}. (11)
Then, the payoﬀ matrix in Figure 3 represents material payoﬀs, but not satisfac-
tion. From (10) and (11), the satisfaction of a C-player who plays contract 0 and is
paired with a W-player who chooses the same contract is
uC(0,0) = π0 − βC(π0 − w0)
because π0 > w0. Utility of a C-player decreases in the non-egalitarian contract,
as his advantageous inequality aversion grows, because convention 0 favors these
players. In this same situation, the payoﬀ for the W-player is
uW(0,0) = w0 − αW(π0 − w0).
Contract 0 represents disadvantage for W-players. That’s why, in this case, their
utility diminishes as inequality (π0 − w0) and aversion (αW) grow.
But, what determines disadvantageous inequality aversion for these players?
Now, it’s time of linking this part of the model with the one developed in the last
section. There, we constructed a theory of clientelism, arguing that low wages or
incomes make people more vulnerable to gifts and oﬀerings by politicians. Conse-
quently, we assume that W-population members are beneﬁted by gifts when engaged
in a clientelistic relation. Evidence suggests that workers or tenants occupy the re-
ceiver role in clientelism. The reason is simple: contract 0, the non-egalitarian
contract, represents a disadvantage for this class. We infer that clientelistic gifts
have at least two eﬀects on low income citizens: ﬁrst, it stimulates them to vote
for certain candidates. And second, as gifts may satisfy several needs, it attenuates
inequality aversion. This argument justiﬁes the following assumption:
Assumption 2.
The degree of disadvantageous inequality aversion experimented by W-population cit-
izens depends on the magnitude of the gifts received by clientelistic politicians. This
is,8
αW = αW(GW)
Furthermore, higher gifts imply a less disadvantageous inequality aversion, which
means that for any pair of gifts of magnitudes GW and G′
W
8Note that we replaced Gc for GW. This is because above we assumed that W-population
members are the ones who receive gifts when a clientelistic relation is established.
13GW ≥ G′
W ⇒ αW(GW) ≤ αW(G′
W)
In fact, for any GW > 0, αW(0) > αW(GW), which means that the highest level of
inequality aversion is felt when there’s no clientelism and no gift.
Returning to the coordination game in Figure 3, when both players choose con-
tract 0, this is the only case in which material payoﬀs diﬀer from satisfaction, because
in any other situation the payoﬀs are the same for both players. In particular, when
both players select contract 1, inequality aversion has no consequence because this
is an egalitarian contract.
Using these transformed payoﬀs, and after some simple calculations and a bit of
algebra, we can state the replicator equations of our model. The evolution of the
proportion of C-players following strategy 0 is given by
˙ x = x(1 − x){y[π0 − βC(π0 − w0)] − (1 − y)π1} (12)
while in the case of W-players we have
˙ y = y(1 − y){x[w0 − αW(π0 − w0)] − (1 − x)w1}. (13)
The following theorem describes the dynamics of the system composed by equations
(12) and (13). In particular, it shows how the proportion of players (workers and
capitalists, or land owners and sharecroppers) programmed to propose/accept egal-
itarian or non-egalitarian contracts, evolves over time. This evolution depends on
initial conditions, such as how large inequality is or how strong inequality aversion
is for the players.
Theorem 1.
Suppose that (10) and (11) describe the preferences of members of social classes C
and W, respectively. Then, for the contract game with material payoﬀs in Figure 3,
whose dynamical system is described by the replicator equations (12) and (13), we
have:
1. Frequency distributions (0,0) and (1,1) are the only asymptotically stable states.
2. Frequency distribution (x∗,y∗) is a saddle point, where
x∗ =
w1




π0 + π1 − βC(π0 − w0)
.
Proof.
From (12), ˙ x = 0 if x = 0, x = 1, or if
y∗ =
π1
π0 + π1 − βC(π0 − w0)
14By assumption, βC ∈ [0,1]. This implies that y∗ ∈ (0,1), as we should expect. On
the other hand, from (13), ˙ y = 0 if y = 0, y = 1, or if
x∗ =
w1
w0 + w1 − αW(π0 − w0)
We assume that w0 ≥ αW(π0−w0) so that contract (0,0) is a Nash Equilibrium of the
contract game with inequality aversion. Then, x∗ ∈ (0,1]. Frequency distributions
(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1) and (x∗,y∗) are ﬁxed points of the non-linear dynamical
system described by the replicator equations (12) and (13). It’s straightforward to
show that (0,1) and (1,0) are unstable states. We will concentrate on the three
remaining states.












whose determinant is DetJ(0,0) = π1w1 > 0. Its trace is trJ(0,0) = −(π1 +
w1) < 0. Then, frequency distribution (0,0) is an asymptotically stable state
of the dynamical system, which means that it is an evolutionary equilibrium.





whose determinant and trace are, respectively, detJ(1,1) = [π0 − βC(π0 −
w0)][w0 − αW(π0 − w0)] > 0 and trJ(1,1) = −[π0 − βC(π0 − w0)] − [w0 −
αW(π0 − w0)] < 0. This implies that frequency distribution (1,1) is also an
asymptotically stable state, or equivalently, an evolutionary equilibrium. This
completes condition 1 of this theorem.








− x∗y∗(1 − x∗)(1 − y∗)[π0 − βC(π0 − w0) + π1][w0 − αW(π0 − w0) + w1] < 0
This immediately implies that (x∗,y∗) is a saddle point, completing the proof.
15According to this theorem, both the egalitarian and the non-egalitarian contracts
are the evolutionary equilibria9 of our contract game. Condition 1 states that in the
long run, every agent will be playing one of the two contracts. This result should not
be a surprise, because for any payoﬀ monotonic dynamic, a strict Nash equilibrium
is also an asymptotically stable state [Young (1998)]. Figure 4 presents the phase













Figure 4: Phase diagram for the contract game
Initial conditions determine which equilibrium prevails, so history matters. The
ﬁnal outcome depends on the initial proportion of agents of each type. If a suﬃcient
number of players propose/accept the non-egalitarian contract in the beginning of
the game, the society will converge towards this equilibrium. As Figure 4 shows, the
size each equilibrium’s basin of attraction depends on the frequency distributions
(x∗,y∗). But, as shown by condition 2 of theorem 1, these frequencies depend on the
material payoﬀs for the players (πk and wk, for k = 0,1), the degree of advantageous
inequality aversion in class C (βC), the degree of disadvantageous inequality aversion
in class W (αW), and the level of inequality implied by the non-egalitarian contract
(π0 − w0).
When αW decreases, the basin of attraction of the egalitarian contract shrinks
because x∗ becomes smaller. But earlier we assumed that for population W the de-
gree of disadvantageous inequality aversion αW depends on whether citizens received
9Remember that an evolutionary equilibrium is an asymptotically stable state of the replicator
dynamics.
16a gift or not. In other words, clientelism aﬀects inequality aversion within population
W. Also, we assumed that α′
W(Gc) < 0, which means that more generous gifts imply
lower inequality aversion. A comparison of a clientelistic society, in which Gc > 0,
with a non-clientelistic one, suggests that the former has a lower αW. Thus, the
basin of attraction for the egalitarian society is smaller if clientelism exists or, in
other words, clientelism produces income inequality.
5 Adaptive Learning, Stochastic Shocks, and Clientelism
Even though the model analyzed in the previous section is insightful on identifying
the impact of clientelism on income inequality, it’s deterministic ﬂavor is perhaps
a main problem. Besides, as we said before, the replicator dynamic is an extreme
version of evolution, that many times is not the best way of describing social systems.
In this section, we will move towards a more realistic conception of learning within
human interaction.
It can be assumed that at choosing a strategy in a game, players determine their
best response to what they expect other agents will play, and that expectations are
full-ﬁlling. This is the main approach of classical game theory. On the other extreme,
one may argue that agents inherit some strategy form their parents, and that over
time ﬁttest strategies prevail. Conventional evolutionary game theory, based on
evolutionary stable states or the replicator dynamics, follows this path. Perhaps
an intermediate approach, half way from the former two, is the one proposed by
stochastic game theory, as developed by Young (1993, 1998) or Kandori, Mailath
and Rob (1993). Recognizing that clientelism is an interesting feature of political
and social systems, we now take this approach.
Lets consider again our two populations, C and W. Each period, a player of
C-population is randomly paired with a player of W-population, to interact in the
contract game. At any time period t, players select some strategy si(t), with si(t) ∈
{0,1}, for i = C,W. This is, each player chooses contract 0 or contract 1. The
play at time t is a strategy proﬁle s(t) = (sC(t),sW(t)), that speciﬁes which strategy
chose each player. In the last section we assumed that players were “programmed”
to follow one of the two strategies, and that over time the frequency distributions
of these evolved according to the replicator dynamics. Now we suppose that players
update their strategies following an adaptive learning mechanism.
Players have a memory of m periods. This means that at any period t+ 1, they
are capable of looking the last m plays of the game, represented by the history proﬁle
h = (s(t − m + 1),...,s(t − 2),s(t − 1),s(t)). The magnitude of m represents how
far in the past the player is capable of looking back. From this memory proﬁle the
agent takes a sample of size k ≤ m. These means that our player may not be able of
studying all the proﬁles of h. At random, draws a sample of size s because “[e]ach
player has access to information about what some of the previous players have done,
which is relayed through established networks of friends, neighbors, co-workers, and
so on” [Young (1998). For example, many times people deciding to accept a labor
contract, use to ask around, or simply search, if the wage is competitive or if the
17number of working hours is fair. But people have limited cognitive capacities, so
that k ≤ m bounds players’ rationality.
Let’s call ε > 0 the error rate of the learning process. Then, the updating mech-
anism is as follows. Each period t player i selects with probability 1 − ε, his best
response to the frequency distribution of strategies observed within the sample of
size k. With probability ε selects randomly a strategy si(t) ∈ {0,1}. We can inter-
pret ε as the frequency at which the player chooses erroneously any strategy. It’s
a consequence of perturbations or shocks that aﬀect people’s behavior. As Bowles
(2003) suggests, the non-best reply actions associated with ε may represent idiosyn-
cratic plays related with experimentation, whim, error, or intentional mistakes. For
example, some players could decide to reject non-egalitarian contacts even though
these are the established condition, simply because they want to promote collective
action against an unequal distribution of surplus.
If players use this updating mechanism, which convention will prevail? From
theorem 4.1 of Young (1993), we know that when the process is unperturbed, that
is, when ε = 0, and if information is suﬃciently incomplete (if k/m ≤ 1/2), from any
initial state the process will converge with probability one either to the egalitarian
contract or to the non-egalitarian one. This result is equivalent with the one we found
in the last section assuming the replicator dynamics. But if ε > 0 any absorbing
state is subject to perturbation that may dislodge one equilibrium or the other. A
state is stochastically stable if in the long run, it is observed most of the time, as
the error rate vanishes.
This concept is central for our analysis because it will tell us in which convention,
egalitarian or non- egalitarian, social classes will spend most of the time. As we
should expect, in this model this depends on clientelism.
Theorem 2.
Suppose that players of populations C and W exhibit inequality aversion, as repre-
sented by utility functions (10) and (11). Then, if information is suﬃciently incom-
plete (k/m ≤ 1/2) while k and m are large, the non-egalitarian convention (0,0) of
the contract game is the unique stochastically stable state if
[π0 − βC(π0 − w0)][w0 − αW(π0 − w0)] > π1w1 (14)
Proof.
Following Harsanyi and Selten (1988) we know that an equilibrium is risk-dominant
if maximizes the expected payoﬀ of each player when each one assumes that the
others select any strategy with equal probability. For a C-class player contract 0
strictly risk-dominates contract 1 if






For a W-class player contract 0 strictly risk dominates if






Then, multiplying (15) and (16), contract 0 is the unique risk-dominant equilibrium
if
[π0 − βC(π0 − w0)][w0 − αW(π0 − w0)] > π1w1
From Young (1998), theorem 4.1, we know that the stochastically stable state is the
risk dominant equilibrium.
The interpretation of this theorem is straightforward. Even though the Markov
process generated by the adaptive learning mechanism introduced in this section is
ergodic, i.e. we are not able to anticipate ex-ante where the system will be in the
future, we can tell where it will be most of the time on the long run. The stochasti-
cally stable state is the most probable outcome. In our case, (14) determines when
the non-egalitarian contract is the stochastically stable state. Two forces determine
the outcome. First, as income inequality grows (π0 − w0), the left hand of (14) de-
creases. Higher inequality makes the non-egalitarian contract less sustainable on the
long run, as a consequence of inequality aversion. In contrast , as αW decreases, the
left hand term increases, augmenting the probability of observing the non-egalitarian
contract most of the time. But remember that disadvantageous inequality aversion
among W-players αW is a function of clientelism. As the gift given by the politician
(GW) grows, aversion decreases. Then, more clientelism implies greater chances of
getting caught in the unequal equilibrium.
Now we can complete our argument of why clientelism is a poverty trap. In
section 3 we showed that if w is low, it’s easier for clientelism to emerge. Once it is
established and a gift GW is given from the patron to the client, inequality aversion of
workers or tenants is attenuated. This increases the likelihood of the non-egalitarian
division of surplus between capitalists and workers or landlords and sharecroppers.
Then, patron incomes are higher, while client wages our lower. This, again, makes
things easier for clientelism to emerge. The society is caught in a poverty trap.
6 Conclusions
In this article we studied the relation between political clientelism and income in-
equality and poverty. A ﬁrst postwar wave of anthropological and sociological lit-
erature recognized that clientelism is an asymmetrical, dyadic relation, mediated
mainly by reciprocity. We tried to reconcile this position with modern economic ap-
proaches, using behavioral game theory. Our major ﬁnding is that low incomes and
poverty stimulate clientelism, mainly because the level of reciprocity needed for it to
emerge is low when citizens lack of basic goods and services. The model of section
3 could be extended in order to include the eﬀects of repeated interactions between
politician, brokers, and voters. We infer that this extension would rescue the impact
19of self-regarding preferences as an explanation of clientelism. We take for granted
that many citizens give political support the gifts they receive, not only because of
reciprocity, but also because of the threat of loosing beneﬁts in future interactions.
The second part of our model showed how clientelism aﬀects the distribution of
surplus within a society. Formal and informal contracts specify how the gains of
cooperation between classes are to be divided. But this division may be more or less
egalitarian, and it is of our interest to understand what are the underlying forces
behind this division. We argued in sections 4 and 5 of this article that clientelism
augments the probability that the non-egalitarian contract is the ﬁnal outcome of this
“class struggle”. In fact, higher clientelism makes it harder for workers or tenants to
use collective action as non-best response strategy, capable of dislodging an unequal
situation. Clientelism makes the egalitarian contract both less accessible and less
persistent. In this sense, it becomes an important strategy used by one class for the
perpetuation of a favorable division of surplus.
Our model presented an argument of why clientelism is a poverty trap. In a
poor and unequal society, clientelism is a natural outcome. Low incomes make
things easier for clientelistic politicians, as shown in section 3, but also, as sections
4 and 5 show, clientelism increases the likelihood of non-egalitarian divisions of
surplus. Then, wages will be lower for clients and higher for patrons, making, again,
clientelism a natural outcome.
We suggest some important extensions of our model in order to correct some
of its main ﬂaws. First, it is necessary to extend the model presented in section
4, going beyond the dyadic relation presented there. The conjunction of several
dyads conforms a clientelistic network. Urban and rural citizens relate themselves
with local leaders, who act as brokers and link them with regional politicians. They
connect the network with national candidates, whose power and inﬂuence make them
important players in determining the level of public goods. Second, it is important to
determine what the place of undercover organizations is in all this process. It is well
known and documented that in some countries all sorts of maﬁas, drug traﬃckers,
rebel groups, and other types if illegal organizations, penetrate political systems and
contribute to the development of clientelism. A better understanding of clientelistic
networks would contribute, for sure, to the formulation of policies for controlling this
phenomenon.
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